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CONSTRAINTS ON PROFESSIONAL POWER IN SOVIET-TYPE SOCIETY: 
INSIGHTS FROM THE SOLIDARITY PERIOD IN POL AND^ 
One of the nightmares facing marxism is that socialist revolution might put a force other 
than a universal proletariat into power. One Polish participant in the Russian Revolution, Waclaw 
Machajski, thought that the Bolshevik-inspired transformation of society led to the rule of the East 
European intellectual stratum, the intelligentsia, rather than of the working class. Although few 
think the intelligentsia is in any sense presently the ruling class in Soviet-type societies, this 
prospect continues to haunt contemporary analysts. Ivan Szelenyi (1982, 1986-87 and with 
Gyorgy Konrad, 1979) offers the most sophisticated argument along these lines when he argues 
an alternative future facing East European societies to be one where the intelligentsia becomes 
such a ruling class. But this is a future, not the present. For the intelligentsia to wield such 
power, some kind of social transformation is necessary. The tutelage of the political elite over the 
intelligentsia must be ended. But of what does this tutelage consist? What are the barriers to the 
class power of the intelligentsia? That depends on the part of the intelligentsia one considers. 
One of the main problems facing such class analysis is the considerable differentiation of 
the intelligentsia into various occupations and organizations. Both the constraints on and 
prospects for power vary across occupations and organizations. Analysis of separate occupations 
can limit the complications accompanying this heterogeneity. At the same time, it need not 
eliminate class from the analytical framework. Class analysis is a level of analysis more abstract 
than that of occupations, but one to which the analysis of occupations or professions can 
contribute. 
We propose to clarify the constraints on the class power of the intelligentsia in Soviet-type 
society through a comparison of the constraints on professional power of two occupations, 
engineers and physicians, in Poland in 1980-81. Professional power is a less general and 
empirically more accessible notion than class power. It refers to 1) the ability of the members of a 
highly educated occupation to control the conditions of their occupational practice and reproduction; 
and 2) the ability of this group to shape other institutions, particularly of distribution, in its 
collective interest. Focusing on the constraints on and prospects for such professional power allows 
for differentiated treatment of members of the intelligentsia, while nevertheless allowing a 
subsequent move to the more abstract discussion of class and its relationship to social 
transformation. 
The comparison of these two professions should be fruitful because the occupations are 
quite different. In capitalist societies, physicians are the prototypical profession. They have an 
authority built into their professional work which provides a foundation for considerable power 
(Starr, 1982). In Poland, physicians have considerably less professional power while presumably 
having similar cultural foundations for authority in doctor-patient relations. On the contrary, 
engineers are probably the most influential profession in Soviet-type society; they are a t  the very 
least numerically dominant, which is a situation quite different from that found in capitalist 
societies. A comparison of these two professions therefore ought to provide one of the more 
favorable pictures of the prospects for professional power. I t  also can suggest the differentiation 
inherent in this intelligentsia, operationally defined a s  those with higher educations (following 
Konrad and Szelenyi, 1979). 
This analysis of physicians and engineers concentrates on the period from the summer of 
1980 to December 13, 1981. The strikes of the summer of 1980 led to the formation of the 
independent trade union Solidarity. On December 13, 1981, martial law was declared by the 
Polish authorities and the experiment with self-organization in Soviet-type society was effectively 
ended. Due to the organizational pluralism and limitations on censorship in this period, the 
frustrations and aspirations' of Polish citizens are more apparent a t  this time than in any other. 
This is also true for professionals, where their own perceptions of constraints and prospects for 
professional power can complement those interpretations based on a more etic model of 
professionalism. In this paper, "constraints" on professional power refers principally to the objects 
of critiques made by professionals during 1980-81. "Prospects" refers primarily to those 
possibilities for augmenting professional power embryonic in the reforms suggested in the period. 
Hence, a study of the discourse and activities of Polish professionals in 1980-81 ought to improve 
considerably our understanding of the conditions of professional power in Soviet-type societj7. 
Before we consider the main theme of the constraints on and prospects for professional 
power, we shall briefly consider Polish "professionals" in three contexts: 1) the relationship of 
professionals to the East European term "intelligentsia"; 2) the place of professionals in the class 
structure of Soviet-type society; and 3) the role played by professionals in the Solidarity period. 
The clarification of each of these problems facilitates the final discussion of the relevance of 
understanding professional power to class analysis and social transformation. 
PROFESSIONALS AND INTELLIGENTSIA IN SOL'IET-TYPE SOCIETY 
To use the term "professional" when referring to the highly educated in Eastern Europe 
- .  , .. .. 
requires caution. The traditional term used to describe this Eastern European intellectual stratum 
is "intelligentsia". This is not an East European equivalent for western "professionals". 
"Intelligentsia" is a word with East European origins connoting far more than people with 
a common type of occupation. In the early modern period, i t  was more of an estate with a certain 
lifestyle, a particular ethos, and even a special morality. Gella (1971) defined the old Polish 
intelligentsia as  "a culturally homogenous social stratum of educated people united by charismatic 
feelings and a certain set of values." When the term came to be applied to post-revolutionary 
Eastern Europe, it was changed so that it represented a set of people with certain non-manual 
occupations (Szczepanski, 1962). Sometimes it referred to all those in non-manual occupations, 
and other times only those with higher educations. Polish sociologists have for the most part 
abandoned this term in their statistical research and refer to this group as  "specialists with higher 
. . .  
education" (sDeclAlisci z wyzszym w v k z t a l c e ~ .  The typical translation of this term is 
"professionals". 
The practical utility of such a translation is obvious. Many of the same occupations that 
constitute the professions in the West are those same occupations which constititute specialists 
with higher education in the East: engineers, physicians, lawyers and so on. They share a similar 
base of technical knowledge and a common form of discourse, one Gouldner (1979) calls the 
"culture of critical discourse". 
There are, of course, many ways in which professionals in Soviet- type society differ from 
professionals in market societies. East European professionals share few of the characteristics of 
organizational autonomy sociologists consider indicative of an occupation's professionalism 
(Wilensky, 1964). What is more, the rise of professionalism is linked to the development of an 
autonomous civil society within capitalism, while in East Central Europe, the growth of the 
intellectual and professional stratum was linked to the struggle by the intelligentsia to conquer the 
state apparatus (Bauman, 1987). Contemporary differences follow that historical pattern: 
western professions are characterized by the services they provide to others, minimizing the goal 
setting component of their activity; in contrast, the East European intelligentsia is defined in large 
part by this teleological component and thus represents a fundamentally different kind of 
intellectual (Szelenyi 1982). Although there are thus several reasons why the East European 
"intelligentsia" can be distinguished from the Western "professional" in capitalism, in other 
important ways these intellectuals are sufficiently similar to merit use of a common term. 
Perhaps one of the most significant is their own self-consciousness and discourse. 
In the end of the 1970's in Poland, there was renewed interest in the proper role of the 
intelligentsia. A real intelligentsia, it was argued, should not be consumed with narrow self 
interested careerism, but rather should be committed to defend the interests of the Polish nation 
(Hirszowicz, 1980). The Workers Defense Committee CKomitet Obronv R o b o t n i k  or KOR) 
epitomized this traditional role of the intelligentsia, in that intellectuals from different fields were 
actively engaged in common political work in support of oppressed workers and their families 
(Lipski, 1985). 
Alongside of this traditional intelligentsia model for the highly educated there is also a 
. . more "professional" model: the group, Experience and the Future (Doswi&zenie i P r s z y s k  or 
Dip) (Bielaskak, 1981). Here, instead of a generalized political opposition, members of the 
intelligentsia used their particular professional expertise to suggest concrete reforms in order to 
relieve specifk problems facing Poland. There were groups specializing in social policy, economic 
policy, health policy, and so on. Here Szelenyi's model of professionalism is more relevant, since 
Dip's members emphasized technical expertise more than a general obligation of political 
leadership in their activities. 2 
Although both KOR and Dip were composed of intellectual elites, in 1980 there were 
approximately 93 7,700 employees in the state economy with higher educations (Rocznik 
Statystczny, 1983:59). The masses of highly educated workers were not involved actively in these 
transformative groups, but they were a significant audience for their ideas. This became obvious 
in the Solidarity period, when all sectors of society contributed to the reconstruction of the 
institutions of Polish life. Professionals were involved in both general political (intelligentsia) and 
occupationally specialized (professional) forms. 
I t  is important to recognize, therefore, that among the masses of the highly educated in 
Poland there is a k i d  of dual consciousness: an affinity with the historical intelligentsia combined 
with a professional ethos. Among those with some kind of technical expertise, the traditional 
intelligentsia commitment to the nation is likely to be played out within a specific realm of 
professional expertise. In the discourse of 1980-81, we find engineers talking about helping the 
nation to escape the crisis through economic reform and self management; physicians offer 
schemes to relieve the crisis in health care. Given this emphasis on technical expertise among the 
highly educated masses, especially among those with some form of technical or applied training, 
we think it legitimate to call some of the highly educated in Poland "professionals", even while 
noting that there are important differences between professionals in East and West. 
PROFESSIONALS IN BETWEEN 
Class analysis of Soviet-type society normally identifies the ruling class as  those with 
control over the means of production through their control over the bureaucratic and planning 
apparatus (Djilas, 1957; Kuron and Modzelewski, 1966). The ruled or exploited class finds its 
center in the traditional working class, but can sometimes incorporate all those who are employees 
of the state, including professionals. Some of the discourse of 1980-81 reinforces this image. 
Representatives from several large enterprises formed an association called the Network 
0 to promote social ownership of the means of production, so as to end "state capitalism" and 
the class privilege of the "owners of the Polish Peoples Republic" ("Siec", 1981). In this depiction 
of class relations, professionals and workers are equally dominated. The terminology of the period 
reflected this consciousness too: in the "we" and "they" division, the "we" evolved from 
membership in a particular factory, b v  pracownic~ zakladu X) to membership in a particular 
occupation (mv ~ornicv) to "we workers" (mv robotnicp) to "we authentic representatives of the 
class of employees" autentvcznym representantem klasv ~racuiacei) to people of work (W 
pracv) (Kuczynski, 1983:470-71) vs. them, or the authorities (mi. wladzy), who were constituted 
in the institutions of the system (Lindenberg and Nowak, 1985: 12). 
Part  of Solidarity's discourse was an  emphasis on the absence of significant disagreements 
within the movement, leading some observers to complain that the union, through its "solidarism" 
(emphasizing the unity of society vs. the authorities), discouraged the airing of quite legitimate 
differences (Staniszkis, 1984:113-14). Indeed, the natural basis for a seDarate "professional" 
consciousness seems to have been discouraged to a considerable degree. 
A "natural" basis for a separate professional consciousness is suggested by Ivan Szlenyi's 
(1982) analysis of the prospects for the class domination of the intelligentsia in Soviet-type society. 
There are two principal legitimating bases for the distribution of the surplus in socialism: one 
which is based on superior teleological knowledge, favoring the Communist Party or the 
intelligentsia, and one which is based on actual production of the surplus, favoring direct 
producers. Emphasis on the latter basis leads toward a greater democratization of the society, 
while the former facilitates a class domination based on expertise, either political or technocratic. 
In Szelenyi's scheme, professionals benefit under the former mode of legitimation, especially in a 
situation where the arbitrary power of the political elite is restrained. Their potential class rule is 
mitigated, however, by their continued domination by political elites. Professional power would be 
enhanced by dismantling the tutelage of political elites, while a t  the same time maintaining the 
legitimation principle that the allocation of surplus should be based on what people know rather 
than who makes the surplus in the first place. 
An examination of professionals during the Solidarity period is particularly useful for 
illuminating the problems of, and prospects for, such class power by professionals in Soviet-type 
society. While the demands of the Solidarity movement included an end to political domination of 
professionalism, a t  the same time parts of the movement recommended instituting new checks on 
the professional domination of the direct producers. This discourse reflected the position of 
professionals in Soviet-type society: in between the political elites who in normal periods exert 
political tutelage over professionalism, and the direct producers who are the power base for ending 
that tutelage. But professional activities during the Solidarity period should not be reduced to 
some simple reflection of occupational or class interests, since the Solidarity movement itself was 
more of a "total" movement encompassing several dimensions. 
PROFESSIONALS IN THE SOLIDARITY PERIOD 
Skilled workers in large factories were the leading group in the Solidarity movement, but 
professionals were certainly a close runner-up in terms of influence. According to public opinion 
surveys, approximately two thirds of those with higher educations were members of Solidarity in 
December 1981, about the same a s  other groups. There were proportionately fewer engineers and 
managerial personnel in the union, but even they were more often than not members of Solidarity 
(Adamski, 1982; see Kennedy, 1987). The influence of those with higher educations is most 
apparent in the constitution of the leadership. 
The proportion of people with university or polytechnic degrees in the leadership far 
exceeds their representation in the labor force. Those with higher educations represented only 8 
per cent of the labor force in 1980 (Etocmik Statystycmy, 1983:59). Of the 33 top activist-officials 
in the union, over one third (12) had higher educations from universities or technical institutes. 
Four of these leading figures were engineers (Pakulski, 1986:72). The highly educated were also 
likely to be leaders in the regional bodies of Solidarity; approximately one third (21) of the 62 
members of Upper Silesian Regional Commission were highly educated (15 were engineers, 4 
physicians and 2 teachers). A significant number (13) of "semi-professional" technicians were also 
members of the council ("Wybory", 1981). 
This broad participation by professionals in Solidarity, however, should not be reduced to a 
single interest based on occupation or class. The movement was simultaneously a trade union 
movement of employees, a movement for the democratization of society, and a national 
independence movement (Touraine, et  al. 1983). A nationwide poll of Solidarity's members found 
the national dimension to be the most fundamental reason for membership although its status as 
an Independen,$ union was also important. However, these various qualities had an uneven appeal 
to different parts of the movement. National independence was relatively more important among 
delegates to Solidarity's Congress while the independent character of the trade union was 
relatively more important to the rank and file ("Czym Jest Solidarnosc?", 1981). The discussion 
groups in Touraine's research also showed different tendencies: the Upper Silesian region, 
including Katowice, tended to emphasize the union aspect; the Mazowsze-Warsaw region 
emphasized the democratic; in Wroclaw, the nationalism of the "true Poles" came out most 
forcefully. The more highly educated males were the most extreme in regard to nationalism 
(Touraine, 1983: 167). 
Thus, to the degree that the Solidarity movement was simultaneously a movement for 
trade union rights, democracy and national independence, professional support for Solidarity 
should not be reduced to some narrow occupational interest. Nor can their considerable influence 
in the movement be interpreted as  some simple indication that Solidarity was a vehicle to 
professional class power. Their particular professional expertise or interests were probably less 
important for explaining the'ir frequent leadership than the discursive abilities derived from their 
educational background. Jadwiga Staniszkis (1984:127) notes that nonworkers gained a 
disproportionate share of leading positions because election procedures required short speeches, 
discouraging and disadvantaging those workers with more limited "linguistic codes". Thus, in this 
sense, the participation of professionals as  activists might be more in keeping with the historical 
legacy of the Polish intelligentsia, especially in so far a s  the highly educated led the membership to 
emphasize national goals. The relationship of Solidarity to the prospects for p r o f e s u  power 
can be found elsewhere. 
Solidarity was not only a movement of activists, but a movement that inspired the renewal 
of the entire society. It was, as Andrew Arato (1981) notes, a movement to create a "civil society" 
in Poland, one where plurality, legality and publicity would reign over the state and not the state 
over them. It  was also a movement to restore rationality to a society racked by economic, social 
and health crisis. As such, the highly educated were involved as  professionals both inside and 
outside of Solidarity in efforts to resolve these problems and introduce reform. Discussions of 
these problems in various periodicals are of great value for giving us insight into the problems 
professionals consider most serious and the solutions they most favor. The discourse of 1980-81 
can illuminate the constraints on, and prospects for, professional power in Poland specifically, and 
perhaps in Soviet-type societies generally. 
OBSTACLES TO PROFESSIONAL POWER AND CONTROL OVER INVESTMENT 
One of the principal professional complaints during the Solidarity period concerned the 
allocation of national resources. Both engineers and physicians decried the authorities' priorities 
and the mechanisms guiding investment decisions. This discourse was a departure from that 
which was heard a decade earlier. 
1. PHYSICIANS 
The health profession was generally optimistic at the beginning of the 1970's. During 
Wladyslaw Gomulka's tenure as  First Party Secretary between 1956 and 1970, health care and 
social policy were generally not matters for public debate or discussion. In fact, according to 
Magdalena Sokolowska (1974:441), the very terms "social policy" and "social planning" only 
entered the government's vocabulary after Gierek took office. At the Sixth Party Congress in 
1971, health care and reform became an important ingredient in Gierek's new social contract with 
Polish society. Sokolowska's (1 9 74) remarks suggested a confidence in and optimism about what 
Gierek's reforms could accomplish. 
Gierek's reform sought to reorganize the administration of health care, increase the ratio of 
doctors to population, expand hospital resources, widen public health care clientele to include 
private farmers, and institute an improved pay structure for health care employees (Russell- 
Hodgsons, 1982). In spite of this ambitious and expanded program, the real share of resources 
allocated to the health sector improved slightly if a t  all in Gierek's tenure. This expansion of 
responsibilities without an adequate increase in resources was the principal theme in the 
Experience and the Future (Dip) health commission's account of the origins of the health care 
problems. 
The real share of resources allocated to the health sector improved slightly if a t  all in 
Gierek's tenure. The share of total investment devoted to health and social care increased slightly 
in this period (Rocznik Statystyczny 1981:184), but it was still comparatively small to the 
proportion of the budget it enjoyed in 1960 Dip,  1983:497). Total health care expenditures did 
increase in the period, although they increased a t  a lower rate than total expenditures @iP, 
1983:497). In vivid contrast to the optimism of the early 1970's, by the end of the 1970's and 
early 19807s, medical professionals were extremely critical of governmental budgetary priorities, 
especially in light of the fact that mortality rates and other indicators of Poland's health showed 
significant deterioration (Dip, 1983:490). Thus, Dip demanded that the government reconsider its 
budgetary priorities and allocate more funds to health care. The authorities also recognized the 
seriousness of the health crisis in this period, as the third plenum of the Central Committee of the 
PZPR on June 30, 1980 was devoted to a discussion of these matters (Kania, 1981). 
The considerable attention to health care problems prior to the rise of Solidarity is reflected 
in the Gdansk Agreement of August 1980 which led to the union's formation. Point 16 of the 
Agreement concerns the demands of the health sector. Although it begins with a plea for an  
increase in the resources given to the health sector, this point contains 30 specific demands, 
ranging from various kinds of wage demands to defining spinal diseases a s  occupational health 
hazards for dentists (see Brumberg, 1983: 29 1-92). Thus, not only were medical professionals 
pushing for an increase in the resources allocated their sector, from the very beginning of the 
Solidarity movement they were also quite specific about how those added resources should be used. 
Point 16 became the basis for subsequent medical sector organizing and negotiations between the 
Medical Section of Solidarity and the authorities (Kulerski, 1980). 
Engineers were both more numerous than physicians and more widely dispersed 
throughout the economy. They were like physicians, however, in that they became part of the 
chorus of criticism in the late 1970's and early 1980's. And also as  with physicians, this criticism 
reflected a change from the beginning of the 1970's. 
2. ENGINEERS 
Gierek's assumption of power had prompted a grand optimism among engineers. Gierek 
fancied himself an expert manager and technocrat and his regime portrayed itself as  providing 
competent technocractic leadership (Wesolowski, 1987). The regime concentrated its energies on 
bringing Western technology to Poland and assumed that through this import living standards in 
Poland would be improved. Gierek emphasized that the Party should stay out of the af'fairs of 
administration and leave matters to professionals (Kolankiewicz, 1973:230). Reflecting the 
fashion of professional titles, regime members went so far a s  to award themselves professional 
engineering titles in spite of questionable credentials ("Jak Edward Gierek Zostal Inzynierem?"; 
also Hirszowicz, 1980). The alliance between engineers and the Gierek regime was represented 
further in the appointment of Jan  Kaczmarek as the Minister of Higher Education and the General 
Secretary of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Kaczmarek is one of Poland's leading technocratic 
experts, and is now the elected president of the Supreme Technical Organization ( N a c d  
. . 
Z _ O r g a n l h n i c z n a  or NOT). As one Polish journalist put it, the 1970's was a period of 
"fascination of technical progress, an iopening to the West, great programs of investment, great 
careers ..." (Baczynski, 1983). The economic crisis, which first became apparent in 1976 and later 
peaked in 1980-82, prompted many engineers to change their minds about the policies of the 
Gierek regime. 
Unlike physicians, engineers were not able to develop a common position that their 
profession was shortchanged in the distribution of national resources. Some sectors in which 
engineers worked received considerable resources, while other engineers worked in relatively 
underprivileged settings. However, two alternative themes criticizing investment were relevant 
across sectors. 
One theme was the irresponsibility of the authorities for relying on foreign licenses when in 
fact Poland had the human capital to develop Polish technologies. In one particularly strong 
manifestation of professional self-consciousness, Kazimierz Kloc (1981: 11) accused the authorities 
of following this policy with the specific intention of limiting the independent bargaining power of 
professional groups. We shall return to this issue of autonomous professional groups in the next 
section. This criticism was, however, a relatively new development. Individual enginers profited 
personally from the reliance on foreign technologies, in that they gained foreign contacts and were 
able to travel abroad. This criticism, although it may have existed in the 1970's, was probably not 
very popular. I t  became more important in 1980-81 as  it became useful in the redefinition of 
engineers' alliances. 
The other major theme that runs through various critiques of investment policy concerns 
the "rationality" of the authorities' strategies for development. Because the nature of the 
irrationality varies according to industry, much of the engineering analysis of investment policies 
focused on specific industries and the actual form rather than level of investment. PrzegM 
Techniczny, the official technical journal of Polish engineers and technicians, carried reviews of 
investment policies in several different industries. In a way, their critiques resemble Thorstein 
Veblen's (1965) early thesis of revolutionary engineers struggling for rationality against the 
captains of industry. But instead of railing against captains of industry, Polish engineers usually 
challenged governmental officials. 
For example, in the beginning of the 19807s, Poland faced severe shortages in several 
items, including white paper. Wieczorkowska and Wozniak (1981) documented one reason for this 
shortage: an investment in Kwidzyn that has produced no paper but has absorbed most of the 
investment funds allocated to the paper industry. The origins of this investment catastrophe lay 
in the ignorance by a govermental ministry of the advice of experts from a research bureau and 
local agency. 
The Ministry of Forestry and Wood Industries and the State Presidium opted for a plan 
which required the purchase of a huge paper production plant "lock, stock and barrel" from 
capitalist countries. The Presidium chose this most expensive option despite 1) advice from 
experts a t  the Bureau for Paper Industry Products calling for a combination of foreign and 
domestic technologies and contractors and 2) a subsequent recommendation by the Lodz Bureau 
for Paper Industry Products that domestic sources be the primary contractors. This foreign 
contract was made on the grounds that it would be completed the quickest, in a matter of only four 
years after stzrting up in 1973. The project was fraught with delays, however. 
After one year, no foreign contractor had been established. Finally, a Canadian firm was 
contracted for consultation in 1975. After one year of work on the project, the Association of 
Paper Manufacturers (Zjednoczenie Prze- or ZPP) charged that the plant could 
not be profitable. In reply, the Council of Ministers argued that the plant was indispensible. In 
1977, the Lodz Bureau and ZPP argued that the Canadians were being paid too much, and 
advocated that the Canadians be cut out of the project. The Ministry and Polish paper firm 
struggled to maintain the foreign connection and made a deal where the Canadians received even 
more money for their startup costs. By the time this article appeared, the plant was still not 
producing paper and was not expected to do so until at least 1985. 
Those engineers interviewed for the article could point to other lower level reasons for 
delays too, but the blame usually began with the upper levels. One engineer, a Director of 
Investments for the ZPP, said, "many people can be blamed for this, beginning with two vice 
premiers, the ZPP, the Planning Commission and the builders". The director of the Kwidzyn 
works focused his blame higher: "People from the Central Committee often came to inspect the 
site. They would make decisions and leave. At conferences, the completion of plans was not 
noted, only new ones undertaken. It's much easier to make decisions than check and account for 
unfulfilled duties". Ultimately, however, it was tough to fix blame on any one person or body; the 
Kwidzyn debacle was the consequence of systemic failures. But certainly, one of the most 
important systemic failures concerned the power of governmental authorities to override expert 
opinions. 
Another investment boondoggle occurred in the mining areas of Silesia. On a visit to West 
Germany, Gierek and his associates arranged a contract with a firm to produce gasoline from low 
quality coal (Mejro, 1981). Gierek made this initial deal without counsel from chemical industry 
experts. The deal was reviewed subsequently by an expert commission which offered a negative 
assessment and recommended against pursuing it. This review managed to delay the project for a 
while, but Prime Minister Piotr Jaroszewicz was able to revive it by camouflaging it. As the 
commission advised, this investment proved to be a completely irrational use of funds, since the 
gasoline produced from this coal would cost more than buying it on the international market, would 
be unsuitable for many of its proposed uses in Poland, and the money used to produce it could be 
better spent establishing a new coal mine. 
Besides indicting these top political figures, Mejro was critical of their advisors: "It's 
difficult to imagine that the advisors to Prime Minister Jaroszewicz, who legitimated themselves 
through high academic titles, did not know about this future gas production." Leading political 
figures normally had professionals supporting their policies of course. For some critics, however, 
these very links led the politicians' professional advisors to adopt questionable expert positions. 
Despite Gierek's fall in 1980, some professionals continued to support his strategy of 
borrowing from the West and building huge expensive plants. This was illustrated in a discussion 
with three engineers who serve as  vice chairmen in the Central Union of Milk Cooperatives 
(Karwicka-Rychlewicz and Nakielski, 1981). In the beginning of the 198OYs, milk and milk 
products were in short supply. The Przeylad Technicznv interviewer challenged the milk industry 
engineers to admit that this was a consequence of the investment strategies of the 197OYs, where 
huge dairies were constructed using foreign technologies. The engineers defended the investments, 
arguing that the huge plants were necessary for the increased demand for milk, especially in the 
large cities. Besides, these new plants were more productive than the old small dairies. Further, 
Poland had to purchase machinery from abroad since there was no satisfactory domestic 
machinery for bottling, and butter and cheese products. Finally, the engineers argued, production 
capacitjl had grown dramatically over the decade; the main problem was that consumption has 
grown faster. 
The interviewer, in his commentary, disagreed with the engineers' proposals, arguing that 
old solutions based on more money and investments were no solutions. Interviews with two 
research engineers supported the interviewer's skepticism. Both engineers advocated a greater 
decentralization of production and establishment of true cooperatives, not top down state run 
enterprises. The research engineers were also critical of the extensive bureaucracy and advocated 
greater support for the small farmer, the direct producer. The implication of the research 
engineers' critique was that the first three engineers failed to find fault with the overcentralized 
and overbureaucratized organization of production because they were at the top of that 
organization. 
These investigations illustrate the nature of engineers' discourse in 1980-81. They were 
mainly concerned with improving the "rationality" of investments and national resources. As with 
most of these other industries, these engineer critics believe that national resources are suflicient, 
but that they require a more rational form of distribution. Rationality comes from two major 
changes: a stronger role for indeDendent professional bodies in determining governmental policy 
and freeing up the economy from political domination. 
OBSTACLES TO PROFESSIONAL POWER AND SELF-ORGANIZATION 
One of the most general themes of the Solidarity movement was the emphasis on self- 
organization. In fact, it can be considered the main principle defining conflict during the legal 
existence of Solidarity (Kennedy, 1985: 122-46). Autonomous professional organizations are 
instrumental to establishing professional power. 
In general, professionals have the greatest power when their own profession is unified by a 
single organization which controls the reproduction of their ranks and the market for their 
services. When non-professional organizations interfere in such professional control, professional 
authority is undermined and the chances for its translation into other desired social values 
reduced. According to Johnson (1972:43), producers of services have the best chance to define the 
character of the producer-consumer relationship when two conditions are fulfilled: 1) the 
occupational group has power resources in addition to its professional authority that enable it to 
impose its view of how the sale of services should be organized; and 2) when the consumers are 
themselves unorganized and heterogenous. Comparisons between professions (Larson, 1977) and 
of one profession over time (Starr, 1982) support this contention. Professionals in Soviet-type 
societies are limited in their power precisely because they do not have autonomous organizations 
they control themselves, and their client, the state, is itself highly organized. 
1. PHYSICIANS 
Before World War 11, Polish professions were organized into autonomous organizations. 
After Poland regained independence in 1918, the medical profession was organized formally in 
1921. The Polish parliament, the Sejm, legislated 49 articles on the medical profession and 
established the Izba Lekarska, or Physicians' Council, a professional body with control over the 
practice of medicine. Each province had its own Izba Lekarska and a central Izba Lekarska 
negotiated with the government ministries. This body was an autonomous self governing 
association and was the only body that could grant or withdraw the right to practice medicine 
(Hornowski, 1981; Labanowska, 1978). 
After World War 11 and the establishment of political hegemony by the Polish United 
Workers' Party (Polska Ziednoczona Partia Robotnicza, or PZPR), professional organizations lost 
their autonomy. In 1946, the Trade Union of Health Care Employees (Zwiazek Zawodowv 
Pracownikow Sluzbv Zdrowia or ZZPSZ) was founded. 'Campaigns were initiated against the I& 
hka -  and other physicians' associations, indicting them as class enemies and as  being 
incompatible with socialism. The Izba LRkarska was disbanded and health care was placed under 
the control-of the Ministry of Health and Social Welfare. Physicians were organized within the 
union. In 1952, an association, the Polish Physicians' Association, (Polskie Towarzvstwa 
Lekarskie), was formed as  a scientific society. When Polish Stalinism was being dismantled in 
1956, physicians sought renewed organizational autonomy, but to no avail. I t  was not until the 
founding of Solidarity that a medical organization independent of the authorities would appear: 
the Medical Section of Solidarity. 
Nurses and physicians had been active in the free trade union movement preceding 
Solidarity. Alina Pienkowska, a Gdansk nurse, was one of three women on the original eighteen 
member Gdansk Interfactory Strike Committee and later became the chair of the Medical Section 
of Solidarity. She along with Barbara Przedwojska, a Gdansk physician, composed Point 16 in the 
Gdansk agreement. The Medical Section of Solidarity thus grew out of this larger self-organizing 
movement. 
Efforts to organize an independent health section spread widely after the signing of the 
Gdansk agreement. The authorities tried to undermine these activities by introducing a medical 
reform bill (Resolution 81/80 in the Council of Ministers) without negotiating with any 
representatives of the new self-organizing movement. The authorities also encouraged the old 
Trade Union of Health Care Employees (ZZPSZ) to adopt new statutes suggesting independence 
from the authorities in order to attract health care employees away from the new self-organizing 
movement. The Solidarity health care activists pointed out that this "old union in new clothing" 
was not really independent, since it pursued its autonomy on direction from the top (Gmaj, 1980). 
Thus, they argued, affiliation with Solidarity is the only way to achieve real autonomy. And they 
were in large part successful, since according to one of its leading activists, about 70 to 80 per cent 
of the former members of ZZPSZ quit to join Solidarity (Kulerski, 1980). But was this p- 
organizational autonomy? This new medical section of Solidarity was not, after all, an exclusively 
"professional" organization. I t  included nurses, porters, ambulance drivers and other health care 
employees too. 
Highly educated state employees in some areas did fear that their occupational concerns 
would be swallowed up by the larger union (Krzeminski, 1983:347-48). Government affiliated 
branch unions tried to play on these fears among health care employees too. However, Solidarity 
activists had a simple reply: Solidarity got more for health care workers through the Gdansk 
agreement than these branch unions accomplished during 36 years of work (NTO, October 26, 
1980). Independent struggles had to take place through a solidary front of working people, they 
argued. They could not accomplish their aims separately. 
There were, however, independent organizations of professionals too. Most notable is the 
Trade Union of Polish Physicians (Zwiazek Zawodowv I&arzv Polskich or ZZLP). In an article in 
Polityka in 1980, representatives of the ZZPSZ and of Solidarity offered their views on the health 
situation. Their comments on the ZZLP are revealing for the place of independent professional 
organizations in 1980 Poland. Both spokesmen emphasized the good relations their organizations 
had with the professional union, but it was Biernacki (1980), the spokesman for the ZZPSZ, who 
emphasized the success of the professional union having about 9,000 physicians as  members or 
about 12 per cent of those who were eligible. Marek Kulerski (1980), a physician who represented 
Solidarity, instead emphasized, "In the field of health service, we are the only one that counts." 
Subsequent consultations clarify this divergence. 
Zofia Kuratowska (1987b), a physician activist, claims that such autonomous trade unions 
a s  the ZZLP were supported by the government with a goal of undermining Solidarity. Most who 
belonged to these autonomous unions belonged out of allegiance to the authorities. The motivations 
for the few "honest" people who belonged to the ZZLP, she supposed, was the belief that the 
business of physicians was very different from the business of others. But the power of Solidarity, 
she argued, was that everyone was together. Only workers had the power to influence the 
authorities. "To be together with workers was real important," she said. 
One might find a touch of irony in the alliances drawn in 1980 and in 1946. The 
authorities found indpendent professional organizations anti-socialist in the earlier period, while in 
the latter, found them a useful bulwark against the challenge posed by the working class. 
Most physicians were content to organize through the multi-occupational Medical Section of 
Solidarity. According to leading activists in the Section, about 90 per cent of physicians belonged, 
and about 20 per cent were activists in the Medical Section. Thus, while self-organization was an 
important goal among physicians, the power relations of the conflict were such that independence 
had first to be assured from the authorities, and that could only be achieved through Solidarity. 
This is especially true when one considers the power to strike. 
Physicians and nurses would not strike during this period. According to Sokolowska 
(1982:99), health care is a humanitarian public service in the Polish social consciousness and a 
strike would be anathema to that ideal. Beyond that service ideal, such a strike would probably be 
suicidal for the health section anyway, since it would only hurt and alienate the health care 
patients who are the medical sector's allies. Most (77 per cent) of the Mazowsze region of 
---. Solidarity felt that health care workers directly caring for the sick should not have the right to 
strike ("Z Prac OBSu", 1981). 
Since the health sector could not strike, it could not pressure the authorities to negotiate 
fairly. On two occasions, the government representatives refused to reach reasonable 
compromises with the medical section. It was only after the Solidarity negotiators occupied a 
government building in Gdansk, medical students staged sit-in's throughout the country, and 
(especially) when workers from several large factories threatened to go out on a solidarity strike 
- with the health sector, that the authorities made a reasonable compromise (Kennedy, 1985:348- 
58). Physicians, thus, were highly dependent on the Medical Section of Solidarity, which in turn 
was dependent o,n the larger union for pressing its aims. 
2. ENGINEERS 
The situation among engineers is analogous to that found among physicians. Engineers 
were also organ&ed into a multi-occupational body with limited autonomy. With technicians, they 
. . 
formed the Supreme Technical Organization (Hgiszelna Or- Techn- or NOT),the main 
goals of which were: 
1. active cooperation in the construction of socialism in Poland; 
2. the development of technology and Polish technical thought; 
3. the defense of the occupation and interests of engineers and technicians; 
4. cooperation of the scientific-technological associations and members of NOT; 
5. representation of the Polish technical world in Poland and abroad a t  meetings and 
congresses; 
6. the popularization of technical and techno-economic principles in society (see Hoser, 
1974:283). 
NOT, a s  with trade unions in Soviet-type society, thus has two goals: first the promotion 
of the welfare of the whole, and only secondly the self-defense of its members. One way for NOT 
to promote social welfare is to encourage responsible behavior among its members. During 1980- 
81, the leaders of NOT were encouraging engineers to work more diligently for the salvation of the 
economy ("Do Inzynierow i Technikow Polskich", 1981). They raised the issue of engineering 
ethics ("Dyskusje i Decyzje", 1981), a theme raised many times before (Tymowski, 1971). NOT 
leaders proudly noted that engineers were engaged in societal renewal in all sectors of society, in 
the Extraordinary Congress of the PZPR, in the branch unions and were even among the 
authorities of Solidarity ("W Nowa Kadencja", 1981). However, NOT itself was an  object of 
renewal and challenge in this period too. 
Criticism came from within the authorities. Witold Ochremiak (1981, nr 29-30:lO-ll), a 
lad Technic Party representative working a t  P r z e ~  znv, discussed NOT'S internal turmoil at 
considerable length. NOT was made up of various more specialized associations, but members of 
these associations charged NOT with becoming too centralized and bureaucratic and therefore 
unresponsive to the needs of its associations. Ochremiak recommended that the organization 
follow the general wave of democratization in the society and decentralize. 
This kind of criticism by the authorities, however, missed the main challenge of 1980-81. 
The authorities focused on conflicts within the association rather than on the relationship between 
the association and the authorities and between the association and the mass of engineers. It 
failed to ask whether engineers needed an independent association that would have as  a higher 
priority the defense of engineers' interests. 
Engineers associated with Solidarity emphasized precisely these themes. In an article in 
w d n i k  S o l i d a r w  Stanislaw Klimaszewski (1981) described the horrendous state of affairs in 
working conditions and living standards for engineers (see Kennedy, 1987). He linked this 
engineering crisis to the overall economic crisis, for which he blamed the investment policies of the 
early 1970's. NOT did nothing to discourage those policies which created an unhealthy 
dependence on foreign technologies, despite being consulted about the policies. One solution, he 
thought, lay in an independent association of engineers and technicians. 
In August 1981 an  appeal did in fact appear in Tycodnik Solidarnosc and Przegld  
Techniczny for the formation of a new NOT, but this time the w e n d e n t  Technical Organization 
(Niezalezna Or 
. . 
eanlzacla T e c h n ~ d .  The text of the appeal emphasizes that an organization needs 
to be formed that would defend the interests of engineers and technicians at both national and 
individual levek3 The old NOT was not up to the task because it was "owned" by the authorities 
(Apel, 1981). 
This organization apparently had neither the time nor the support to become a dominant 
organization among engineers. Engineers were more likely to be active in, and organized around, 
their workplace. This is not surprising since engineering interests were so diverse, and 
occupational interests were so closely tied to individual plants and ministries. As a consequence, 
engineers were more active in the form of self organization most relevant to their interests: self- 
management. 
OBSTACLES TO PROFESSIONAL POWER AND SELF-MANAGEMENT 
1. ENGINEERS 
That engineers were engaged in the reforms surrounding self-management should not be 
surprising since one of the principal complaints of engineers before this period was the political 
domination of production. Already in 1956, NOT submitted a document to the Council of Ministers 
providing the necessary professional qualifications for various positions in the economy, suggesting 
the role of political qualifications be reduced (Kolankiewicz, 1973: 195-98). Ultimately the 
government rejected NOT'S advice, but the tension between political loyalty and competence did 
not go away. It reappeared as a major theme in 1980-81 in the struggle for self-management and 
the end of the "negative" selection of management through nomenklatura. 
In April of 1981 the Network of Enterprise Organizations of the Independent Self- 
Governing Trade Union Solidarity 0 was founded. Representatives of initally seventeen but 
eventually more than fifty of Poland's largest enterprises sought a way to reconstruct the failing 
economy that was combined with the organization of workers' councils. The Network based its 
plan on the "democratization" of the factories by creating "social enterprises". The enterprise 
would be run by democratically elected employee councils (radv pracownicze) which would be 
responsible for appointing the factory manager and negotiating with trade unions. The state 
would exert control over the enterprise through various economic instruments like taxes, customs 
duties, and credits, but not through direct political control. 
The "social enterprise" concept, initially conceived as a way of sharing management with 
the authorities, was eventually transformed into a focus on getting the Party out of the enterprise 
and the economy (Touraine, et a1 1983: 163). Activists believed that central planning was the 
"main source of this country's economic crisis" (Persky and Flam, 1982:179). The Network 
attacked in this fashion the authorities' control over the economy and indeed the dependency of 
professionals on the good will of the authorities. Given the combination of councils and the union, 
managers eventually found that it was more important to maintain good relations with enterprise 
employees than it was with the authorities (Staniszkis, 1984:207, 216). In some cases, managers 
went so far as  to suggest that Solidarity form an alliance with management against the central 
apparatus in the name of efficiency (Touraine, et  al. 1983: 109; Rychard, forthcoming). 
Self-management and economic reform (for the two were by and large inseparable) were 
the dominant themes of the union between April and November 1981. They were also prominent 
in P r z e ~ U e c h n i c z n v  in 1980-81. Engineers, especially those in managerial positions, or 
aspiring to them, would be affected directly. A relaxation of political controls over advancement 
would, according to the professional discourse, lead to a personnel policy based more on 
qualifications. Stanislaw Karas (1981), writing in the Warsaw daily Zvcie W a r m ,  complained 
about the "negative selection" of managerial personnel that led to underemployment of the highly 
educated and the managerial ranks being filled with those with less than higher educations. 
Solidarity's reforms would, on the contrary, emphasize managerial expertise in the election of 
managers from an open competitive pool. In fact, one self-management team from Wroclaw 
(Kozinski et  al, pp. 1, 6) wrote an article in &odnik Solidarnosc about how to choose the most 
competent director. In order to qualify for their competition, all of the candidates had to have 
higher educations. Of the 23 who competed, 19 were engineers. 
The self-management movement in 1981 was the principal means by which engineers 
envisioned an end to their political tutelage by the authorities. The Party would presumably still 
have some influence on managerial selection, but only a s  one representative on a factory council in 
which representatives of the unions in the enterprise were also representatives. 
2. PHYSICIANS 
Physicians were involved in the self management movement in a different way than were 
engineers. The functionally analogous movement for professional control over occupational 
practice among physicians was probably the effort to reconstruct the Jzba Lekarska. This 
physicians' body was not as  actively supported as self-management, for several reasons. 
The &a ' s a w  was an exclusively professional body whose reestablishment would lead 
to an absolute increase in professional privilege. It would lead to increased professional control 
over the conditions of physicians' practice and reproduction of their ranks through its control over 
the licensing of physicians. It did not have the same democratic potential as  self management, 
since non-physicians did not have influence over the body, as workers had over engineers in self- 
management. Thus, the Jzba Lekarska did not enjoy the support of nurses and other medical 
personnel, who argued that if physicians could have such a body, why shouldn't they? 
Some physicians were also opposed to the establishment of the Jzba Lekarska, especially 
those physicians outside the Medical Academies. One of the regional physicians interviewed by 
Kennedy in 1984 claimed that its reestablishment would lead to the further domination of medicine 
by the elites of the profession. There was resistance to the Jzba Lekarska from within the 
profession and in the larger medical field, although attitudes towards it may have changed since 
1981 among health care activists. 
In 1983, the Polskie Towarszvstwo Lekarskie submitted to the Sejm Commission on Health 
Care the prospectus for the restoration of the Jzba Lekarska. Health care activists seem to be in 
favor of its reestablishment if it is to be an independent organization. Magdalena Sokolowska 
(1987) sees it as  a progressive move in so far as  it represents a "decolonization" of the system 
through the creation of more autonomous groups. Kuratowska (1987a) argues that a new 
independent democratically elected Jzba L e k a r h  should be formed to oversee ethical standards in 
the medical profession, given the real deterioration of those standards in recent years. 
Kuratowska (1987b) argues, however, that it must be completely independent. I t  would be too 
dangerous otherwise, since one can always say somebody is acting unethically and end their 
practice for political reasons. The & must also have zed democratic elections, in order for it to 
have real moral authority. Otherwise, it will become just another boring institution in which no 
one wants to participate. She is in favor of the draft on the Jzba Lekarska proposed by the Polskie 
Towarzvstwo Lekarskie although there are two major drawbacks. First of all, physicians 
belonging to the military service, secret service and prison system are not subject to the 
(which is horrible, since there is where the system of medical ethics is worst, she argues). This is 
probably a necessary compromise, however, because the authorities would lose too much power in 
these sensitive sectors. The second limitation refers to the continuing influence of the Ministry of 
Health which could change the head of the a under "special conditions". I t  is, she argues, 
nevertheless good that it can't affect elections. 
OBSTACLES TO PROFESSIONAL POWER AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 
One of the principal means by which professionals established their power in western 
capitalism is through the establishment of control over the reproduction of their ranks in higher 
education (Noble, 1977; Larson, 1977; Starr, 1982). During 1980-81, there was considerable 
discussion about reforming Polish higher education. The Independent Student Union Wiezaleznp 
Zwiazek Stdentow) in particular worked for the elimination of obligatory courses in Russian, 
Marxist-Leninist ideology and military training and for the establishment of a more autonomous 
and internally democratic university structure (Persky, 1982: 17 7-80). Most institutions of higher 
education seemed to be pushing for the same things: autonomy, pluralism, better pay for the staff 
and better organization and financing of institutions ("Zalozenia programowe OZ NSZZ Solidarnosc 
we PW", 1981). However, the relationship of these and other prospective reforms to professionals 
and the broader Solidarity movement is a complicated matter, deserving full treatment elsewhere. 
Nevertheless, we shall try to illustrate the complexity of this relationship, by considering the 
higher education of engineers. 
World War I1 had devastating consequences for the Polish engineering profession. In 
1938, there were some 12,000 to 14,000 engineers in Poland; after Poland was liberated from 
Nazi occupation, there were only about 7,000 engineers left. With the reconstruction of Poland's 
infrastructure and industry the top priority, higher education gave precedence to the training of 
engineers. The number of polytechnical schools and of technical students increased. In 1938, 
there were only 7,593 students enrolled in 3 polytechnical schools, but already by 1945146, there 
were 9 higher technical schools with 12,465 students enrolled. Opportunities for becoming 
engineers were expanded and the expectations for completing a degree were lowered (Hoser, 
1970). In 1937138, only 15.3 per cent of the students in higher education were in technical 
studies; by 1950151, 28.4 per cent were in technical studies, with the increase in engineering 
students coming largely a t  the expense of students of law and the humanities (Tymowski, 
1980:48-56). As a consequence of these early educational reforms, Poland now has relatively 
more engineers than developed capitalist societies: in the late 1970's, France had 11.2 ' .  
engineerslthousand persons employed, West Germany, 15.4, Great Britain, 8.7, the United States, 
12.3 but Poland had 22.5 engineersfthousand persons employed (Tymowski, 1982a). 
The "success" of this engineering educational reform has led to the overproduction of 
engineers and the inflation of the instrumental value of their degrees. Consequently, Janusz 
Tymowski (1982), Poland's leading engineer-scholar, has argued that the current number of 
engineers needs to be reduced by about 20 to 25 per cent. Such a reduction could be approached 
most directly by reducing the number of people being trained as engineers. One plan offered in 
1980-81 sought to drastically reduce the number of slots in evening studies (mainly for older 
workers) and to eliminate from day studies (college age students) the lower degree in engineering 
studies, and to offer only a master's degree in engineering (-marriste_r). One Solidarity 
activist participating in an educational reform commission argued against this policy, however, on 
the basis that it was an "elitist" reform, which would restrict opportunities for the children of 
peasants who already suffer educational discrimination (Jacek, 1981). 
The obstacles to professional power we have so far considered (relating to control over 
investment, self-organization and self-management) were generally matters where the interests of 
Solidarity and professionals coincided. Educational reform is another matter. Although most of 
Solidarity would support democratization and other reforms of higher education, educational 
reforms designed to increase professional power are generally "elitist" in that they would restrict 
the number of degrees offered and increase the standards of training provided. As a consequence, 
those Solidarity members who were not already professionals, or whose children were not already 
assured of professional education and status, are loathe to restrict educational opportunities. 
Thus, it seems that a t  least in this instance, professional power is unlikely to be enhanced by 
reforms inspired by pressure from below. In fact, although opposition to the authorities by the 
working class might restrict political tutelage over professionals, this opposition introduces its own 
new constraints on professional power. 
LIMITS TO PROFESSIONAL POWER IN REFORM 
Even in the case of a transformed Soviet-type society, where the Party-state's 
organizational control is reduced and the state itself becomes subject to control by a civil society, 
professional power does not necessarily gain hegemony. I t  does not necessarils face a disorganized 
mass of clients. On the contrary, in a transformation based on struggle from below, professionals 
face several constraints. In 1980- 81, Polish professionals faced a highly organized society which 
was capable of ending their political tutelage. This is evident in self- management. 
While the director is no longer subject to political tutelage, sthe now becomes accountable to 
the employee council of the enterprise. Accountability varied in the several versions of self- 
management reforms being promoted and the government's program for reform offered, not 
surprisingly, the least accountability. But even within Solidarity, there was some disagreement 
about the scope of accountability. For some, the reform should merely assure the appointment of 
a competent manager and stay out of policy formation. For others, the employees' council should 
actually formulate broad enterprise policy, and leave it to the manager to implement. For those 
who emphasized the workers control element of this reform, these councils were to be first and 
foremost democratic institutions, as  opposed to the boards of trustees (radv nadzorcze) which some 
professionals favored. One writer for W d n i k  Sol- (Jakubowicz, 1981:6-7) believed that 
the latter scheme would lead to the domination of representatives of industry (perhaps 
professionals?) and not to genuine democracy. He advised Solidarity members to remain vigilant 
in their struggle for democratic economic reform. 
The self-management reform advocated by the authorities would have limited the influence 
of these employee councils far more, but then again this reform retained greater measures of 
political tutelage in both theory and practice. Economic reform in the last several years has had 
very limited success. It  appears that in Poland, self-management faces insurmountable resistance 
without massive support from below. 
Professionals, in particular engineers, are "in between" once again. While a successful 
self-management reform would eliminate political tutelage, it would replace that with a democratic 
control that might (depending on the nature of the accompanying economic reform) be more 
respectful of professional expertise. A self-management reform that limits democratic control from 
below faces little chance of success in the Polish context, and even if successful, retains some 
measures of political tutelage. 
Physicians' professional power also would likely be constrained by popular organization in 
a Soviet-type society reformed on the basis of the Solidarity model. As we saw, physicians could 
not achieve much influence by themselves, and in fact were dependent at two levels: 1) they were 
forced to ally with other health care workers in the Medical Section of Solidarity; and 2) since the 
majority of employees in that Section would not strike, they were forced to rely on solidarity 
strikes of other organizations to pressure the authorities to negotiate in good faith. There is also 
no evidence that physicians were dominant within the Medical Section itself; nurses, in particular, 
were quite influential. 
All of these anticipations of contraints on professional power in a reformed society rely on 
the model of social transformation prompted from below. If the social transformation of Soviet- 
type society occurs under such a pressure, workers, nurses, and other non-professional or semi- 
professional organizations might be well enough organized in civil society to defend their interests 
against the domination of a new ruling class of professionals. But if social transformation occurs 
from the top down, a s  we might be seeing under Gorbachev, professional class domination becomes 
more possible a s  they take over the instruments of domination which afforded the political elites so 
much power before social transformation. 
A social transformation controlled from above would seem to reflect professional interests 
more than one driven from below. The fact that Gorbachev receives his greatest amount of 
support from the intelligentsia (Brown, 1987:793) is consistant with this'hypothesis. In this sense, 
professionals might take the same route to power as  American engineers, where the definition of 
professionalism came to be identical with corporate managerial success (Noble 1977). Professional 
power, rather than taking the classical route of American lawyers and physicians, might take the 
bureacratic route to hegemony. While this reform prospect offers considerably more power than a 
reform based on pressure from below, professional power will nevertheless remain circumscribed 
for those with little access to bureaucratic power, i.e. physicians. 
The health sector, along with education and other "non-productive" sectors in the economy, 
is in a structurally weak position in contemporary Soviet-type societies. Heavy industry and other 
favored sectors benefit from the national resources disproportionately. Even in a transformed 
society, especially one that is transformed from the top down, there is no obvious reason why the 
health sector and its physicians would gain considerably more power or privilege a t  the macro level 
than they already have. If reform involved the restoration of private practice on a wide scale, 
physicians might benefit a t  the micro level, in terms of control over their relations with patients 
and their personal compensation therefrom. But that in no way guarantees a larger share of 
national resources. 
To the degree that medical clientele can pressure for health care reform, i.e. through a 
Solidarity-type transformation, we can envision more resources going to the health sector than go 
now. But physicians by themselves do not have sufficient bureaucratic power to redistribute 
national resources to the medical sector. Thus, Daniel Bell's (1973) admonition to consider the 
different institutional situses of professionals in assessments of their potential for power becomes 
as  important in considering professionals in a transformed Soviet-type society as  it is in its current 
form. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The Solidarity period in Poland is particularly useful for clarifying constraints on 
professional power in Soviet-type society, and by extension, the possibilities for the intelligentsia as 
a whole to assume the position of a ruling class. Professional critiques showed us in greater detail 
problematic limitations professionals themselves note. This is particularly useful as  a complement 
to those limitations that might be noted by some formal model of professionalism. These analyses 
are also useful in so far as they show us the variations on common themes within the class of the 
highly educated. 
Physicians and engineers cast their critiques in three broad spheres: control over 
investment, self-organization and self-management. Physicians and engineers are different in the 
specifics of their indictments. Given the concentration of physicians in the health sector, they 
could unify in a call for greater resources. Engineers could not make such a call, since they are in 
so many different places in the economy, some of which were supported quite well. Instead, 
engineers could unite in a call for a greater rationality of investment and the development of Polish 
technology. To assure this rationality, engineers argued that their association had to be more 
independent and their opinions more respected by the authorities. 
For physicians, self-organization was less important for the independent advice it could 
render than for its role in pressuring the authorities to relinquish more resources to the health 
sector. But this independence in self-organization was not completely realized, since the medical 
section depended on an alliance with other parts of society, particularly with skilled workers in 
large factories. The Medical Section of Solidarity had too little power by itself. 
Self-management was a less important and more controversial goal for physicians. Its 
manifestation for physicians would have been a vital Izba Lekarsh,  but this body could have 
denied the very solidarism which empowered society against the authorities. This same solidarism 
probably discouraged professional support for elitist educational reforms that might have increased 
professional power but would have gone.against popular sentiment in Solidarity. 
The idea of self-managrnent among engineers, however, was less controversial, since it 
could be embraced by that ideology of societal solidarism. The idea of self-management in fact 
broadened the solidary front. Instead of workers vs. the authorities, the alliance under the guise of 
self management could have pitted the entire world of work -- managers and workers -- against 
political elites. There was some controversy about the form that this self-management would take, 
but this was considered secondary to the struggle for freeing the enterprise and the economy from 
direct political control. 
The Solidarity period also suggested how the power of the highly educated might be 
constrained in a transformed Soviet-type society, especially'one transformed on the basis of a 
challenge from below. A socialist civil society contains its own democratic constraints on 
professional power. A state dominated by civil society does not become an instrument for 
professional manipulation to establish professional privilege. On the contrary, professional power 
based on technical expertise might be balanced by the considerable organizational power of the 
masses in a Soviet-type society transformed on the basis of initiative from below. I t  is useful to 
keep in mind here that the power and privilege of classical professionalism, exemplified by 
American physicians, was achieved in a period when non-professionals were very poorly, if a t  all, 
organized. The Solidarity period was quite the opposite, with skilled workers leading all, including 
professionals, in the struggle for self organization. 
While the class power of the intelligentsia might be circumscribed in a Solidarity-powered 
transformation, professional domination in Soviet-type society has greater prospects when reform 
is initiated from above, as in Gorbachev's plan. But Soviet experts have raised considerable doubt 
as to whether such a reform can succeed without mobilization from below. Repeated attempts at, 
and repeated failures in, economic reform in Poland reinforce that skepticism. Even if Gorbachev 
manages to succeed where Polish leaders have failed, a plan to unleash the "professional middle 
classes" might also spill over to self-organization and the social transformation of the rest of 
society, as  in the Prague Spring. I t  might thus increase the likelihood of reform only by increasing 
the likelihood of reaction by conservative forces. But these are questions we cannot yet answer. 
Here, we only hope to have shown what Polish professionals perceived to be constraints on their 
power, and what new constraints were embryonic in a society transformed by Solidarity. 
NOTES 
We use the term "Soviet-type society" to refer to those societies 'whose 
political economic structure is modeled on the Soviet Union. These are 
industrial societies with state ownership of the major means of production and 
an economy directed to some degree by a plan formulated under the leadership 
of a hegemonic marxist-leninist party. 
* To the Poland specialist, the distinction we draw between intelligentsia and 
professional models might resemble the distinction between romanticism and 
positivism in the Polish political tradition. The romantic tradition is based 
on an almost reckless disregard for the costs of complete defiance of 
occupying powers; the positivist approach advocates a greater reconciliation 
with those powers, trading compromise for stability. The professional and 
positivist political models are similar in so far as they both surrender some 
of their capacities to others: positivists to occupying powers and 
professionals to their clients or employers. The romantic political and 
intelligentsia identification are similar, in so far as both demand a more 
complete identification with the national cause, with little room for 
complicity or compromise. 
In 1984, NOT'S former chairman, Janusz Tymowski, acknowledged in an 
interview with Kennedy that NOT did not defend engineers' interests, 
especially in terms of personal living standards, although he thought it ought 
to move in that direction (Kennedy, 1985:270). 
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